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assistance.1. INTRODUCI1ON
Though there is growing  evidence  that increased  openness  improve  economic  performance
in developing  countries,  there is considerable  skepticism  about the relevance  of this relationship  for
Sub- Saharan Africa.  Notwithstanding  a good deal of country-specific  evidence that African
producers  respond  positively  to improved  incentives,  the skeptics  argue  that increased  openness  does
not work in Sub-Saharan  Africa for various  reasons. Some  argue that reforming  trade regime  to
enhance efficiency  and exports  contributes  less to output growth  than increasing  aid or promoting
faster technical  progress  in agriculture  (Helleiner  1991). Others argue that efficiency  gains from
reforms  may  be small because domestic  producers  cannot reallocate  resources sufficiently  due to
weaknesses  in the human  resource  base, in infrastructure  and in institutions  (Elbadawi,  1992,  p. 5).
This  skepticism  is  fuelled,  in large  measure,  by the dismal  economic  performance  of the Sub-
Saharan  Africa  (SSA)  region as a whole.' Nearly  half the countries  of the region are poorer today
than they were a generation ago (World Bank 1991). More then three quarters of them have
undertaken  policy  reforms  during  this  decade. Thus,  on the face  of it, recent reforms,  including  trade
reforms,  do not appear to be associated  with improved  economic  performance  in the region.
There may  be at least  three reasons  why  increased  openness  resulting  from  trade reform  may
not be associated  with higher aggregate  output levels  and faster growth. First, if producers  do not
respond  to the trade reforms  because  inconsistent  macroeconomic-policies  may  have  undermined  their
credibility,  then greater openness  would  not generate the expected  gains in productivity.  Second,
even when trade rxforms  are credible,  producers  may  be unable to respond to reforms  because  of
domestic  regulations  in product  and factor  markets  or because  of intrinsic  weaknesses  in institutions,
infrastructure  and the human  resource  base.  Again  greater openness  would  not lead to productivity
gains. Third,  even if reforms  are credible  and producers  do respond,  the resulting  productivity  gains
'Growth in GDP per capita has averaged  1.5 percent and -1.0 percent over  the 1965-80  and
1980-90  periods,  respectively.from reform may be offset by declines in factor accumulation. In that event trade reform may not
be associated with higher output  and  GDP growth, though greater  openness  actually improved
productivity.
Unfortunately, there is very little systematic  cross-country  evidence of openness-performance
link in Sub-Saharan Africa that can question such skepticism. Those that exist either do not explicitly
examine the openness-performance link or if they do, their focus is not  Sub-Saharan Africa.  For
example cross-country analysis of the effect of recent reforms (including trade policy reforms) on
performance in SSA (World Bank 1992,  Elbadawi 1992)  show that they have not significantly  affected
their GDP growth. 2 These studies use dummies in the regressions for countries receiving Worid
Bank loans to proxy reforms carried out by those countries.  Since loan dummies cannot indicate
either the extent to which the reforms proposed in the loans were actually implemented or whether
the reforms that were implemented actually increased openness they cannot support or negate the
openness-performance relationship. 3 Most of the cross-country studies that explicitly examine the
openness-performance link do not focus on SSA countries.  There are only five studies that analyze
a sub-set of countries that come close to the SSA sample.  Four of them find a positive relationship
between openness and performance: three find a positive relationship for low income countries (La[
and Rajapatirana  1987, Otani and  Villanueva 1990, Moschos 1991) and  one  finds for  African
2In one study (World Bank 1992) it is found that reforms under adjustment lending has restored
growth in Sub-Saharan Africa to the moderate levels of the 1970s;  the other study (Elbadawi 1992)
using a different base period find that it has had no significant  effect on growth. This is at variance
with the strong positive result for all developing countries (Corbo and Rojas 1991). Another study
(Faini et al 1990) also found weak effect of adjustment loans on growth o0 iuw  income countries.
3Another study (UNDP  1989) had tried to overcome this problem of using loans as proxy for
reform by subjectively  distinguishing  adjustment loan countries that had implemented "strong' reforms
from those that had implemented 'weak" or no reform. Again, the study did not distinguish between
trade reforms and other reforms.
9ncountries (Fosu 1990). The fifth study (Helleiner 1986) finds no significant relationship. 4 All five
studies use a single proxy for openness (i.e., export growth).
This paper attempts to shed light on the cross-country relationship between openness and
performance by investigating it within a production-function framework.  The paper adds to the
empirical  literature  by departing  from  earlier  cross-country analysis of  openness-performance
relationship in three ways. First it uses more appropriate policy  based measures of1openness. Second
it relies on four different measures of openness instead of a single measure.  The use of several
rather  than a single measure is a distinct advantage since estimation results that are robust across
several measures of openness are likely to be more convincing than those that are based on any single
measure. 5
Third, unlike previous studies this paper uses fixed  effects estimation with annual pooled data
in addition  to  the usual cross-section estimation with period-average data.'  The  use of period-
average data may obscure the significant changes in openness that occur over time.  Since most
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa have made substantial changes in commercial and exchange rate
policies over the last decade, period-averages  of any measure of openness is likely to be misleading.
Moreover cross-section  estimation fails  to control for unobserved country-specific  differences that can
bias the coefficient estimates. By pooling annual time-series  and cross-section  data and using country
dummies, the fixed effects model is able to overcome those problems.
The paper finds that differences in levels of or changes in openness accounts for significant
cross-country differences in economic performance  in Sub-Saharan Africa. This result (i.e., significant
4Helleiner (1991) argues (a) that these studies (Moschos 1991, Fosu 1990)  should not be viewed
as evidence of positive openness-performance relationship for SSA because Lussier (1991) cannot
find a positive result when he re-estimates the regression for SSA sample and (b) because they use
outcome (i.e. export growth) as a proxy for trade polic) openness.
5Given the problems with measures of openness cited in Pritchett (1990), it is necessary to use
several measures instead of a single measure.
'Harrison (1991) is an exception.
3positive  coefficient  for openness  variable)  is robust  across  all four measures  of openness. Estimates
for some measures  suggest that on average  a ten percent rise in openness leads to around five
percent improvement  in output of Sub-Saharan  African  countries.  Also the results  for Sub-Saharan
Africa compares  very favorably  with thoise  for developing  countries  in Non-Sub-Saharan  Africa. In
addition,  sensitivity  analysis  suggests  tOat  the positive  openness-performance  relationship  for Sub-
Saharan Africa is robust to the introduction  of macro-economic  policy  in the analysis  (e.g. fiscal
variable).
The rest of this  paper is  organized  as follows.  Section  II reviews  the theoretical  and empirical
basis for the relationship  between  openness  and economic  performance. Section IH discusses  the
problems  of measurement,  especialby  measurement  of openness. Section  IV develops  the framework
for estimating  the openness-performance  relationship,  discusses  the data and reports the results  of
estimation  including  those for the sensitivity  tests. Section  V concludes.
411. OPENNESS  AND  ECONOMIC  PERFORMANCE
The conc&pt  of openness  should  be viewed  s  synonymous  with the notion of neutrality  in
trade policy. Neutrality  means that incentives  are equal or neutral between  saving  a unit of foreign
exchange through import substitutes and earning a  unit of foreign exchange through exports.
Empirically,  this equality  relates  to average  incentives  for import  substitutes  and exports: i.e.  a trade
regime  will  be viewed  as "open"  if it is found to be neutral in an average  sense even  when it is non-
neutral  in respect  of specific  sectors  (Bhagwati  1986).  Thus  trade reform  increases  openness  through
a shift towards  greater neutrality  by reducing  the inequality  in the average  incentives. Though  this
reduction  can be achieved  by either reducing  import  protection  and export restrictions  or by raising
export incentives,  it is more desirable  to achieve  neutrality  through  the former 7.
Theoretical  Basis
Theory suggest that a higher level of openness or increases  in openness promote better
economic performance.  Static allocative  efficiency  gains suggest that greater openness yields
unambiguously  better economic  performance  in terms  of a higher level  of output or income  even if
not in terms of a higher long-run  rate of growth. "New theories of growth  suggest  that a higher
long-run  rate of growth  of output can result from greater openness. However,  they also  show  that
this positive  effect of openness  on growth  is not unambiguous.
The traditional  case  for increased  openness  or enhanced  neutrality  of trade regime  was  based
primarily  on theories  of static  allocative-efficiency  gains. The removal  of trade barriers  expands  the
'Though  trade policy  reform  and trade liberalization  are often used interchangeably,  they  are not
synonymous  in a strict sense. Greater neutrality  may  come from additional  interventions  (e.g. duty
drawback  or export subsidy  interventions  to promote exports) but greater  iberalization  imply  the
removal  of trade interventions.  The former  is dependent  on a country's  institutional  capacity;  it may
not achieve  the objective  of greater neutrality  if poorly  implemented  (Thomas,  Matin  and Nash  1990,
Thomas  et al 1991,  Levy  1989).
5feasible set  of consumption possibilities by providing a  'more  efficient technology" to transform
domestic resources  into goods and  services. Thus, efficiency gains from a  better  allocation of
resources raises the level of national output.  In addition, reduction of trade barriers reduces other
costs of a less open trade regime: deadweight losses arising from domestic monopolies, costs arising
from scale inefficiency, technical inefficie,icy  or X-efficiency  (Liebenstein 1966, Corden 1974) and
costs of rent-seeking and directly unproductive activities (Krueger 1974, Bhagwati 1980).1
The "new"  growth theories suggest a link between openness and the long-run rate of growth
of output rather than a rise in the level of output.  This can occur through the favorable impact of
openness on technological change.  For example openness to trade increases growth rate because it
provides access to a variety of imported inputs which embody new technology (Grossman & Helpman
1992, Romer 1986). Another channel of favorable impact is that greater openness expands the size
of market facing domestic exporters (Krugman 1988) thereby raising returns to ini,ovation and thus
enhancing the country's specialization in research-intensive production.
However, this theoretical literature is not unambiguous about the direction of the effect of
increased openness on the growth rate.  It does not predict that greater openness will  unambiguously
raise the growth rate.  This is because the "new" growth theories also show that  growth can be
lowered by increased foreign competition or it can be increased by import protection if protection
promotes investment in the research-intensive sectors of the relevant country. Thus, under the "new"
growth literature, the direction of the openness-growth relationship is not a theoretical given: it is
an open question for empirical investigation.
8Though early studies of efficiency  gains from removal of trade barriers found them to be small,
being in the range of 1 to 2.5 percent of GDP.  This is because those estimates did not recognize
gains other than static allocative efficiency gains.  Available estimates (Bergsman 1974, Grais et al
1984)  finds the total gains from increased openness to be a multiple of the early estimates. Bergsman
(1974) measured the conventional production cost, a technical inefficiency  cost and a monopoly cost
for four countries in Asia and Latin America (Pakistan, Philippines, Brazil, Mexico) and found it to
range between 4% and 7% of GDP, of which the conventional production cost was less than 1% of
GDP.  Grais et al (1984) obtain much higher percentages.
6Empirical Basis
Empirical  research  have  generally  found  a positive  relationship  between  greater openness  and
economic  performance.  The early  cross-country  work  relied  on changes  in export  growth  or in export
shares as a proxy  for changes  in openness  (See Michalopoulcs  and Jay 1972,  Michae-ly  1977,  Tyler
1981,  Feder 1983,1986,  Balassa  197  tIeller and Porter 1978,  Kavoussi  1984,  Ram 1985,  1987,  Otani
and Villanueva  1990,  Moschos  1991). Most  of these studies  use the aggregate  production  function
framework  to analyze  whether differences  in export performance  explain  cross-country  differences
in economic  growth  after controlling  for growth  in capital  stock and labor. All of them confirm  a
positive  openness  performance  link for developing  countries.
However,  several  of these studies (Michaely  1977,  Tyler 1981,  Kavoussi  1984,  Feder 1986,
Edwards  1989)  have  argued  that a positive  openness-performance  relationship  is not relevant  to low
income  countries  because  such  a link may  not operate below  a threshold  level  of development.  For
example  Michaely  (:977) claims  that 'the positive  association  of the economy's  growth  rate with the
growth  of the export share  (which  is the index  of openness)  appears  to be particularly  strong  among
the more developed countries, and not to exist  at all among the least developed ....  This seems to
indicate  that growth  is affected  by export performance  only once countries  achieve  some minimum
level of development."  Feder (1986)  and Edvwards  (1989)  makes  similar  claims.'
Recent studies have used more appropriate price and policy-based  measures  of openness
(Balassa  1985,  Edwards  1991,  Alam 1991,  Bhalla  and Lau, 1991,  Dollar 1991a,  1991b,  Harrison  1991,
Lopez 1991,  Thomas  et al 1991,  Thomas,  Halevi  and Stanton 1992). Though these studies use
different  measures,  they all confirm  the positive  openness-performance  relationsb  p for developing
countries.
'Helleiner  (1986)  finds  "no  statistically  significant  link  between  the change  in export  share  of GDP
and growth"  in a study  of low  income  countries  heavily  weighted  toward  Sub-Saharan  Africa.
7Virtually all  these cross-country  studies, both early and recent, have three  common
ch&racteristics.  First these studies cover developing  countries  of mn  regions,  the number varying
between 35 and 95 countries. Except Dollar (1991b),  none examine  regional  variations. Second,
except  Bhalla  and Lau (1991)  and Harrison  (1991),  all rely  on cross-sectional  period  averages  of time
series data.  Third, except  arrison (1991),  all studies use a siln3e measure of openness to test
whether  openness  explains  cross-country  differences  in economic  performance.  This paper seeks to
depart from  those studies  in the same  three Icipects: it focuses  on Sub-Saharan  Africa,  uses  annual
time series  cross  section  data and tests several  measures  of openness.
8II.  MEASURING  OPENNESS
Though  there is reasonable  consensus  on measuring  aggregate  economic  performance,  there
is no such consensus  on measuring  openness. Changes  in the level  or in the growth  rate of either
real gross  domestic  product  (GDP) or per capita  real gross  domestic  product  are commonly  used as
indicators of changes in  performance.  On  the other hand no  openness measure is tree of
methodological  problems" 0 and several  different  measures  commonly  used are found to be not highly
correlat -4 (Pritchett 1990).
The are many  reasons  why  summary  measures  of openness  are difficult  to devise. First, the
tariff is only one form of restriction  on openness  and often this is not the most important one. 1
Second, the variety of commonly used nontariff import barriers is large.  They include restrictive
licensing, quotas, outright prohibitions, controls on foreign exchange transactions, advance import
deposits, customs valuation pricing and more.  Quantifying the effects of such restrictions on a
common  scale is extremely  difficult. Price comparisons  are problematic  but even when they are
appropriately  implemented,  they may  capture distortions  from both import barriers and domestic
market  imperfections.  Third,  even  if tariffs  were the onlb  trade intervention  used,  one could  measure
at best  weighted  averages  of varying  tariff  rates  across  commodities.  These  would  provide  a poor idea
of the marginal  protective  effect of the  tariff structure. Also because  of differing  elasticities  of
demand  and supply  across  goods,  aggregate  duty rates or total tariff revenue  as a percent of imports
are a poor measure  of the degree  of restrictiveness.  Fourth, in the presence  of intermediate  goods
the protective  effect of a tariff structure  depends  on tariff rates on final  goods relative  to those on
"0Even  the use of direct price comparisons  made possible  by the work of Summers  and Heston
(1988)  suffers  from small  sample  problem  and from the fact that price distortions  may  reflect both
trade distortions and domestic market distortions.
"In fact, for countries in Sub-Saharan  Africa, non-tariff  barriers like exchange  controls and
licensing  dominate.
9intermediate  inputs. Fifth, the welfare  cost of tariff rates and other impediments  to trade depends
on their general  equilibrium  effects  and the market  structure.' 2
In the literature on cross-country  analysis  of the openness-performance  link, two broad
strategies have been used to measure openness.  One strategy is to use a proximate  effect of
openness  as a proxy  for openness  itself,  e.g. export performance  in terms  of export growth  rates, or
GDP shares  of export (Michaely  1977,  Balassa  1978,  1985,  Tyler 1981,  Kavoussi  1984,  Ram 1985,
1987,  Fosu 1990  Moschos  1991)  or actual  GDP shares  of total trade (Quah and Rauch, 1990,  Levine
and Renelt, 1992).  This amounts  to assuming,  without  rigorous  testing,  a linear  relationship  between
greater openness  and larger  export or trade share  or faster  export or trade growth. On this basis,  a
positive export-GDP or trade-GDP link implies a  positive openness-performance  relationship.
However,  such a proxy  begs  the question  of which  policies,  trade and others, best promote  exports
or total trade.
The other strategy,  which  is probably  more  appropriate,  is to devise  a summary  price-based
and policy-based  measure of changes in the incentive regime for tradables.  This strategy has yielded
both relatively  more subjective  and or more objective measures of openness. The subjective  measures
of the incentive regime for tradables depend more on judgement about the  nature of the trade
regime and about changes in that regime. This judgment is based on levels and movements of several
trade policy instruments. Such measures include the trade-orientation index (World Bank 1987,  Alam
1991), the index of liberalization (Choksi et al 1991, Phillips and Havrylyshyn 1990) and the trade
liberalization index (Halevi, 1989, Thomas et al 1991, Thomas, Halevi and Stanton, 1992)."
'2For example, if substitution possibilities  are moderate, then the welfare costs of distortions will
be small.  Similarly,  restricted trade leads to imperfect competition, which may impose substantial
economic costs.
"Though it is difficult to compare in such measares across countries, they are more likely to be
comparable across countries when judgement on changes in openness is exercised by the same
individuals for all countries (e.g. Thomas et al 1991) rather than when it is exercised by different
individuals for different countries (e.g. Choksi et al 1991).
10The more objective policy-based measures (e.g. Leamer 1988, Edwards 1989, Dollar 1991a,
Syrquin & Chenery 1989, Kaufman 1991) attempt to capture the net effect of various trade poUcie*,
on the incentive regime for tradables.  There are five such policy-based measures of openness that
have been used in various cross-country studies:  the Leamer Index (Leamer 1988, Edwards 1989),
the residual trade share index (Syrquin and Chenery 1989), the purchasing power parity index of
outward orientation  (Lollar  1991a), the  black market exchange rate  premium (Edwards  1989,
Kaufman 1991) and the index of relative price of tradables (Bhalla and Lau 1991).
Most of these summary  price or policy-based  measures of openness are not available for Sub-
Saharan African countries.  The Leamer index" 4, the Syrquin-Chenery trade shares'  index and the
Bhalla-Lau index are not available for more than eight SSA countries for a sufficiently  long period.
Only two are readily available  over time for the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa: Dollar's purchasing-
power parity based index of outward orientation and the black-market premium are available for
around twenty-seven  Sub-Saharan African  countries. The Halevi-Thomas  index  of trade liberalization
is available for around fifteen SSA countries for the period 1978-88.
Choice of Openness Measure
This paper uses four measures of openness:  the black market premium, the Dollar index of
outward orientation, the Halevi-Thomas  index  of trade liberalization, and the actual trade share. The
"Leamer(1988) uses a Hecksher-Ohlin model with nine factors (i.e.capital, three types of labor,
four types of land and oil) to estimate net trade flows  and trade intensity ratios for 183 commodities
at the 3 digit SITC level for 53 countries, including 30 developing countries.  The Leamer index is
based on the difference between the actual trade share of a country and the trade share that is
predicted by the model. Though this approach is quite promising,  its greatest limitation for purposes
of this paper is the fact that it is available for only one year (i.e. 1982) and for only three  Sub-
Saharan African countries.
MThis  trade-share measure is based on the deviation  of the actual from the predicted trade shares,
where the predicted values are obtained from a regression of trade shares on different  relevant
variables like country size, capital inflows and so on (Syrquin and Chenery 1989) and is also not
available overtime.
11choice of these measures is dictated mainly  by their availability  for a sufficient number of Sub-Saharan
African countries over a sufficiently  long period.
The black market or the parallel market premium reflects the excess demand for tradables
and for foreign assets that is not satisfied by the official foreign exchange market.  The greater the
controls on the use of official foreign exchange, the larger is the premium on the "black' or parallel
market exchange rate because the larger is the excess demand for tradables. It is thus directly related
to changes in trade restriction or in openness (May 1982).
One of the two caveats to this relationship weakens it as a proxy for openness. These caveats
arise from the fact that demand for tradables is also a function of aggregate demand pressure in the
economy and demand for foreign assets is also a function of the degree of political instability. The
first implies that the premium on the "black' market for foreign exchange is aLfected  by changes in
aggregate demand in addition  to changes in trade  restrictions.  Thus the premium may rise, if
macroeconomic imbalances raise aggregate demand, even when there is no rise in import or export
restrictions. Fortunately this does not detract from the usefulness of the "premium"  as a measure of
openness.  Increases in aggregate demand with no change in trade restrictions makes the same trade
regime more restrictive and thus less open.  Domestic prices of import-substitutes will rise and the
anti-export bias of the regime will worsen.
On the other hand, when the "premium"  changes because the portfolio excess demand for
foreign assets is affected by political "news"  or  internal civil disturbances it does undermine  the
usefulness of the "premium"  as a measure of openness.  In short, the "premium"  may change due to
speculation, even when there is no change in the degree of restrictiveness  of the trade regime i.e. in
openness.
The Halevi-Thomas  index of trade liberalization is based on a subjective assessment of two
aspects of  the  trade  reform programs carried  out  under  World Bank's structural  and  sectoral
adjustment loans between  1978 and  1989.  The two aspects are:  the  intensity of trade  reform
12proposals in the loans and the extent of implementation of those reform proposals by the recipient
countries. 1'  The countries on which implementation data was available were each assigned a rank
as to  tne  level of  their proposed  reforms.  In addition, the degree  of compliance with reform
proposals was assigned to one of the five levels of implementation: 80%, 60%, 40%, 20%, and 0%
of proposed reforms.  Zero  implementation generally imply near complete reversals of or back-
tracking on trade reform. The product of these two series generates the index of trade liberalization,
or, in other words, a measure of the change in openness of the economy. 17
If the proposals were strong and 80 percent of the proposals were implemented, then the
Halevi-Thomas  index  would attain its highest leveL One problem with this measure is that the initial
trade regime is not incorporated in the measure.  Though weak reform proposals with 80 percent
compliance would suggest low changes in openness, the reform proposals are weak because the
economy may be very open initially. This problem is however likely to be of limited significance,
since virtually  all sample countries began their reform efforts in 1978  or after, from a highly  restrictive
trade regime.
The purchasing-power-parity  based index  of outward orientation index (Dollar 1991a)  is based
on prices for a common basket of consumption goods collected by Summers and Heston (1988) for
the same set  of  benchmark countries.  To  obtain price  of traded  goods, the  relative price of
consumption goods' is regressed on variables like urbanization, GDP per capita (proxy for countys
"this  was developed on the basis of detailed information about trade  reform proposals from
Presidents' Reports on loans and about actual implementation of changes in import tariffs, bans, and
licensing and changes in export taxes and restrictions from project completion reports and country
economic reports (Halevi 1990, Thomas et. al. 1991).
"The intensity of trade reform proposals is categorized as weak(= 1), moderate (=2)  and strong
(=3)  while the degree of implementation is categorized as 80% (=0.8), 60% (=0.6), 40%
(=0.4), 20% (=0.2) and 0%. The product of the two is the index of change in openness.
"This relative price is (RP) a modified version of the Summers and Heston (1988) definition of
relative price.  The latter is:  RP = CP/P,,,I  x 100 while the former is:  RP=epPDc  x 100 where P,,
is the price of consumption goods in the USA and PDC  is the average price in 72 developing countries.
13endowment)  and an interactive  term  of the two. The residual  is the percentage  deviation  (D 8) of the
traded goods prices in that country  from the average  price in developing  countries. The outward
orientation index  is the weighted  average  of the residual  (DI)  and its standard  deviation  (31)19.
This index  suffers  from the problem  that it captures distortions  from all sources,  inc!uding
trade restrictions.  While  a reduction  in price  distortion  will  raise  the outward  orientation  index,  that
reduction may reflect reductions in  domestic market imperfections  instead of  reductions in
interventions. The index  cannot distinguish  between  them.
The fourth measure used in this study is the simplest  available  measure  of openness. It is
based  on actual  trade performance  as reflected  in the unadjusted  share  of total trade in GDP.  This
measure is flawed  in the same way that the use of export performance  as a proxy  for openness  is
deficient. The use of this measure  implicitly  assumes  that the higher  this  share the more  open is the
economy  relative  to other economies. However,  this may  not be the case because  trade flows  are
affected  by  other factors  like  country  size  and/or foreign  capital  flows  (e.g. large  countries  have  small
trade shares),M  as well as by terms of trade changes. Yet, it is a commonly  used measure  in cross-
country  growth  regressions  (Levine  and Renelt 1991,  Quah and Rauch 1990,  Harrison  1991).
" 9Mhe  index  is  expressed  as follows:  DSI= a  +  Ia  o where  a, and  a2are estimated  coefficients 100
of regression  of GDP growth  on D, and 61.
"]Mbe  adjusted  trade shares  seek to overcome  this problem  in various  ways  (Syrquin  and Chenery
1989,  Leamer 1988).
14IV. ESTIMATING OPENNESS-PERFORMANCE  REIATIONSHIP
This section  develops  the estimating  equation  and reports  the estimation  results. In line  with
the existing  empirical  literature  we use the augmented  production  function  approach  to estimate  the
openness-performance  relationship  for Sub-Saharan  Africa. We use two estimation  methods:  the
traditional  cross-section  estimation  using  period-average  and period change  data and the fixed-effect
estimation  using  pooled annual  data with country  dummies  to capture unobserved  country-specific
differences. The estimations  are carried  out for all Sub-Saharan  African  countries  on which  data is
available  i.e.,  27 countries. The regressions  on Sub-Saharan  African  are subjected  to sensitivity  tests
by adding  a macro-economic  policy  variable  in the regression,  as well as compared  with results on
non-Sub-Saharan  Africa.
Framework  for Estlmaflon
We assume  a country's  production  to be characterized  by  the following  aggregate  production
function.
Q = Q{(K L); Al  (1)
where Q is real aggregate  output and K and L denote capital  and labor inputs  respectively. WA"  is
the productivity  or efficiency  parameter  which for the purpose of this study is assumed  to be a
function  of the trade regine (TP) or the degree of openness. Thus
Q = Q{(K,L);A(TP)l  since A =  A(TP)  (2)
15Thus output growth  is a function  of the capital  stock  and the labor force. The policy  variable,  which
in this case  is a measure  of openness  (TP), is also expected  to contnbute to output. On the basis  of
earlier  discussion,  equation (3) shows  that the level  of real aggregate  output (0) can be higher  with
the same capital  and labor inputs if productivity  is higher because  of a greater degree  of openness
(i.e. QIP  > 0 where Qlr is the partial derivative).
To express  the equation  in terms  of growth  rate we differentiate  totally  to obtain:
dQ = QkdK  + QLdL  + Ql,dTP  (3)
where  Q, is the partial  derivative  of 0 with respect  to the its argument  in (1). Dividing  equation (3)
through  by Q and rearranging  terms,  we get:
dQ/Q  = er. dK/K + eL  dVL + eCr  dTPIT  (4)
where dQlQ, dK/K,  dVL, and dTP/T  are the rates of change  of output,  capital labor  and of trade
policy  respectively,  and el is the elasticity  of output with respect to the relevant argument  in (2).
Based on "new' growth  theories this equation  suggests  that the greater the openness  of the trade
regime  the more rapid is growth  because  of faster adoption  and expansion  of technology,  for given
changes  in capital  stock  and labor force.
16Estimation Equations
For purposes  of estimation  we assume  a more flexible  functional  form than is the case in (2)
and (4) by allowing  a constant term.'  Thus the two estimation  equadons used in this paper,
expressed  in logs,  are as follows:
Log Q = B 0 + B1Log K + B 2 Log L + B 3 Log TP  (5)
and
LogDif  Q = CO  + C 1LogDif  K + C2LogDif  L + C4LogDif  TP  (6)
where LogDif X = (Log Xt - Log Xt. 1).
The pure cross-section  estimations  using  period-average  or period change  data apply  equations  (5)
and (6) as shown. The pooled  fixed  effect  estimates  based  on annual  data also use country  dummies
to capture country-specific  differences  in economic  performance,  but are not shown  in equations  (5)
and (6).
Data
The choice of countries  and the total number  of countries  in the regression  analysis  was
dictated  wholly  by  data availability. IThis  relates  to limitations  on data for physical  capital  stock  and
openness  measures. The period under  study  is 1967-87  but since  a lot of the trade reforms  occurred
'AII growth  in output may  not be captured  directly  by the arguments  of the production  function.
For example a Hick's neutral technical  change not measured  directly  by the production inputs
suggests  a non-zero  constant term in the production  function.
1'Two  of the openness  measures  were available  for a shorter period 1978-87.
17in the 1980s,  we also  estimated  the same  equations  for the shorter sub-period  of 1980-87.  Though
the choice of the terminal  year is constrained  by the availability  of data, it nevertheless  covers a
longer period,  and a substantial  part of the 1980s,  than the earlir  studies.
Data on capital  stock,  labor,  GDP, and different  measures  of openness  was compiled  for as
many  Sub-Saharan  African  countries  as possible  for the 1967-87  period. Tbis  was obtained  from the
Supplemental  data base' of World  Development  Report 1991. Data on real gross  domestic  product
(GDP) is based  on national  accounts  data in constant 1980  US dollars,  with rate of growth  of GDP
calculated  as log differences  of real GDP.
Though we have used the largest sample  of Sub-Saharan  African countries for which all
necessary  data is available  (i.e. twenty-seven,  see Table 6) questions may be raised about the
homogeneity  of this sample  of Sub-Saharan  African  countries For example,  it has been argued  that
countries  like Ethiopia, iAberia,  Sudan,  Rwanda,  Uganda, and Zaire have been characterized  by
protracted civil  wars and internal disturbances  and thus their economic  performance  may not be
related  to economic  policy. Similarly,  CFA countries'  performance  is affected  by the fact that they
have not had the use of a key policy  instrument  for improving  incentives  for tradables  (i.e. nominal
exchange rate adjustment)  which was available  to other countries.'  Of ou  sample, thirteen
countries  belong  to these two  categories.2
"The data on physical  capital  stock is due to BhaDa  and Lau (1991)  and is calculated  from data
on annual  fuxed  investment  for 1960-87  in constant 1980  US  dollars. Capital  was accumulated  using
the perpetual  inventory  method  and a 5% depreciation  was  assumed  to derive  the capital  stock  series
in the data base.
24It  has been argued  that their growth  performance  over the 1980s,  has been more dismal  than
others in SSA (Devarajan  and de Melo 1990)  and worse  than even CFA performance  in the 1970s,
in part because  of their inability  to adjust the nominal  exchange  rate in the face of large external
shocks.
'These exclusions  can reduce  the sample  of 27 to only 12 Sub-Saharan  African  countries,  a set
which  is surprisingly  similar  to the group of SSA  countries  deemed  to be in the 'adjustment  phase"
by Hussain  (1992).
18Fortunately,  this lack of homogeneity  in our sample is not a problem in our fxed effect
regressions  because  we use country  dummies  which  capture unobserved  country-specific  differences
in economic  performance.'
Estimation Results
The fixed  effect  estimation  results  show  that increased  openness  has had a favorable  impact
on economic  performance  of Sub-Saharan  Africa.'  Differences  in openness  account  for differences
in cross-country  economic  performance. What is even more interesting  is that the "coefficients"  of
openness for Sub-Saharan  Africa are not significantly  different  from those for Non-Sub-Saharan
Africa  in most  cases. The results  on openness  are also  surprising  robust  to different  sample  sizes  and
different  measures. All  four measures  are significant  and have  the right  sign. In fact the results  also
hold when we control  for macro-economic  policy.
Cross Section  Estimation
Cross-section  and fixed  effect  equations  are estimated  in both level" and 'differencew  forms
involving  GDP level and GDP growth  rate as performance  variables. Cross-section  estimates  use
period-average  data for "level"  and period-growth  data for "change,"  the latter being  the difference
between the base and terminal  years  of the period;  the other uses  year-to-year  difference.
The cross-section  estimates  using  period-average  data,  which  is  in the tradition  of most of the
existing  literature,  yield  poor results  for Sub-Saharan  Africa  (SSA). Period  averages  were computed
2 This  is also confirmed  by the similarity  of the coefficient  estimates  from regressions  using the
12 countries  (not reported in the paper) and that using  the whole  sample.
'rhe  openness  variable  performs  poorly  in the traditional  cross-section  equations  using period-
average  data.
19for 1967-87  and 1981-87  for each variable.' Table 1 estimates  for 'level"  from shows  that only one
measure of openness is significant  at 10% level for Sub-Saharan  Africa for the period 1967-87.
Though cross-section  equations  using period-difference  data (Le.equation  6) can be expected to
capture the total change  in openness  over the period  better than the period average,  the coefficients
on openness  shown  in Table 2 are insignificant.
The weakness  of the openness-performance  link in the cross-section  results is perhaps  not
surprising.' Most developing  countries, including  those in Sub-Saharan  Africa experienced  large
annual  swings  in commercial  and exchange  rate policies  over the last two  decades,  which  is not well
captured by any measure of change averaged  over such long periods.  The average degree of
openness  for a period  of several  decades  or even the average  change  in openness  over such a long
period hides  significant  variations  in individual  country  policy  and performance.
Fxed Effect  Estimation
The two equations (i.e. 5 and 6) are re-estimatec,  using annual pooled data for the same
variables.  To control  for unobserved  country-specific  differences  affecting  the level or growth  rate
of GDP, we included  a dummy  variable  for each country. Tables 3 and 4 report estimates  from
regressions  using  pooled  annual 'level' data and annual  "change"  data respectively.
The fixed effect results for the 'level' form in Table 3 shows  that all four measures  of
openness  are significant  at the 1 % level for the period 1967-87.  Except  for the "premium"  measure
of openness, the same is true for the sub-period  1981-87. Thus after controlling  for changes  in
capital and labor inputs, increased  openness accounts  for better economic  performance  in Sub-
'The  Halevi-Thomas  index  and the Dollar index are available  for shorter periods i.e. 1978  -87
and 1977-87  respectively,  than the other two measures.
2'Harrison  (1991)  also finds  considerably  poorer estimates  of openness-performance  links  in the
cross-section  estimates  relative  to the fixed-effect  estimates.
20Saharan  African  countries. The openness  coefficients  for trade share index is the largest  and that
for the black market premium  is the smallest. On one measure  a 10 percent increase  in openness
leads  to around 5 percent rise in output,  whereas  on another measure  a 10%  rise generates  only 1.5
percent rise in output. In view  of the problems  with  measures  of openness  (Pritchett  1990)  this  range
of estimates  is probably  to be expected.
The fixed  effect estimates  for the equation in "difference"  form show  that the GDP grgwth
rate is also  positively  affected  by increased  openness  as Table  4 confirms.  Both the measures,  trade
share and the black market premium  are significant  for the period 1967-87;3  only the former is
significant  for 1981-87.
As for the other variables  in the regression,  all significant  coefficients  for capital  stock and
labor  have  the right  signs.  The unobserved  country-specific  differences  subsumed  in country  dummies
(not shown  in Tables)  have  a significant  effect  on their  performance  as well. Thus  their absence  from
the regression  would  create an omitted  variables  problem.
Sensitivity  to Inclusion  of Fiscal Policy  Variable
In general  coefficient  estimates  from cross  country  regressions  of economic  performance  are
found to be highly  sensitive  to omitted  policy  variables  (Levine  and Renelt 1992)3'  This is perhaps
not surprising. If more prudent fiscal policies  tend to accompany  increases  in openness', then
excluding  fiscal  variables  from our regressions  may  have  lead to mistakenly  identifying  the gains  in
3 'The Halevi-Thomas  measure  and the Dollar index  were not significant,  in part because there
was  very little annual movement  in those discrete  indices.
31Levine  and Renalt (1992)  find that the positive  association  between trade shares and GDP
growth disappear  in cross-section  of countries  that included  govervnent consumption: Harrison
(1991) found the same thing for the trade-share  measure of openness; however several other
measures  remained  robust.
"Trade reforms  and fiscal adjustment  have often accompanied  each other under World Bank-
adjustment  loans  (see Thomas,  Matin, Nash 1990).
21economic performance to increased openness instead of to more prudent fiscal policy  i.e. the omitted
variable bias.  In that case the inclusion of the fiscal variable in our cross-country regression could
render the openness measure statistically  insignificant.
Sensitivity tests suggest that all the estimated significant coefficients on openness remain
significant  after inclusion of a fiscal  variable. We re-estimated the fixed  effect equations after adding
a fiscal policy term e.g. GDP share of government consumption.'  Table 7 reports the estimated
coefficients for measures of openness and for the fiscal policy variable.  All significant  coefficients
on openness continue to  remain significant in both the  "level" and the "difference' form of the
equations  for the  period 1967-87.  In  addition, except for the  coefficient on  the black market
premium measure, all other coefficient estimates are not signficantly different in regressions  with and
without the fiscal policy  variable. The same is true for the shorter period (1981-87),  except for the
Halevi-Thomas measure, which become insignificant  when the fiscal variable is included.
Thus the estimated positive openness-performance  relationship found for Sub-Saharan Africa
is surprisingly robust to sample periods, to different measures of openness and to the inclusion of
fiscal policy  variable. However, it appears that prudent fiscal poiicy ie. decline in the GDP share of
government consumption has a significant  positive effect on economic performance of Sub-Saharan
Africa.-4 This is consistent with the available empirical finding in cross-country regressicns in the
literature.
'Declining shares of government consumption are generally associated with more prudent fiscal
policy,  because excessive government consumption affect growth adversely.
'In  fact the inclusion of this fiscal variable improves the explanatory power of cross-country
regressions.
22Comparison With Non-Sub-Sabaran Africa
The openness-economic  performance  relationship  in countries  of Sub-Saharan  Africa  are also
found to be comparable  to the relationship  estimated  for countries  of non-Sub-Saharan  Africa  (Tables
8 to 11).  The fixed effect results for Non-Sub-Saharan  Africa is also more significant  than the
corresponding  cross-section  results  (compare  Tables  10 and 11 vs.  8 and 9). For this group too, the
coefficients  for the trade share measure  is the largest  and that on the black market  premium  is the
smallest.
Though  most of the estimated  coefficient  on a given  measure  of openness  (Dollar index  is
the exception)  for non-SSA  group is  higher,  they  are statisticaly  not significantly  different.  Only  three
of the openness  coefficients  for non-SSA  are significantly  higher than for Sub-Spbaran  Africa. This
is con-sistent  with some  of the earlier cross-country  findings  (Kavoussi  1984,  Ram 1985),  where the
openness  coefficient  for low  income  countries  were smaller  than that for non-low  income  countries.
23V. CONCLUSIONS
Though  the paper  does not  delve  empirically  into the exact  mechanisms  and  processes  through
which  openness affects  economic  performance  in Sub-Saharan  Africa, it does provide persuasive
evidence that differences  in openness (both its level and change) do account for cross country
differences  in economic  performance  of countries  in that region. Ihe  results  indicate  that countries
in the Sub-Saharan  African  region which  enhanced the openness  of their trade regimes  have, on
average,  tended  to perform  better than those that have  not. This  cross-country  evidence,  developed
in this paper, on a positive  openness-performance  relationship  in Sub-Saharan  Africa  is surprisingly
robust. Our results  not only hold across  different  measures  of openness,  and different  time periods,
but also  when a macro-economic  policy  variable  is included  in the regressions.
What is more surprising  is that the estimated  openness-performance  link in Sub-Saharan
Africa  is not very different  from that in Non-Sub-Saharan  Africa  over the period studies. Most  of
the coefficients  on openness  are statistically  not significantly  different  for the two groups. Where
they are different,  the coefficient  for Non-Sub-Saharan  Africa  is greater.
Further empirical  research  on the openness-performance  relationship  for Sub-Saharan  Africa
could  proceed  along  the following  two directions.  First, more  aggregative  cross-country  aggregative
analysis  of openness-performance  link should be carried out, by developing  other measures  of
openness. Second,  more microeconomic  analysis  of the openness-performance  relationship  should
be  undertaken.  Aggregative  cross-country  work cannot sharply discriminate  among different
hypotheses about the  mechanisms  and  processes through which openness affects economic
performance,  as well as about the non-trade policies  or factors that impede or facilitate  those
mechanisms  and processes
24TABLE  1
CROSS  SECI1ON ESIMATION USING  PERIOD  AVERAGE  DATA
Sub-Sabarn  Africa
(Log GDP =  bo  + b, log K + b2log L + b) log')
1967-87  198187
___________________  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Trade Shares  -1.63  - . -1.64
(TP1)  (-1.40)  (-1.40)  l
Black market  0.001  . 0.001  |
Premium  (TP2)  (0.56)  (0.56l
|HT Index (TP3)  0.23  0.19  .
(1.40)  (1-36)
D$ Index (TP4)  - 0.09-  - 1.09
(1.72)  (1.65)
Capital  Stock (K)  0.8C  0.76m  0.72w  0.74w*  OM  0.7rm  0.67"  0.78
(9.40)  (11.2)  (7.60)  12.9)  (939)  (11.2)  (6.65)  (8.11)
ILabor  (L)  0.17  0.30  0.47  0.33  0.17  0.30  0.41  0.19
(1.34)  (4.12)  (4.17)  (5.42)  (1.34)  (4.13)  (2.34)  (1.45)
.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
N  27  27  15  26  27  26  15  26
Countries  (No.)  27  27  15  26  27  26  15  26
R2  0.92  0.92  0.94  0.94  0.92  0.92  0.92  0.93
Nate:  InIacp  mulEs  are DOt  ruand  tshi5a  e zt5ed  in pthes
25TABLB  2
(MOSS41CEION ESV1MTION  SINO  *ERIOD DlFP8REtC  DATA
Sul_  Mkk
(LAg  dif GDP - C, + C 1 log dif K + C2 log dif C +  C3 Ig  dif 1?)
1967497  1981-47
_  _  __  (I  (  _  _  D67JV  _  _  _  _
Trade Shares  0.09  0.016  -
(.0.65)  (0.16)
Black market Premium  04.022  4.009
(4.95)  (067)
HT  Index  0.17  0.09
(1.02)  (1.34)
Capital Stock (K)  037'"  0.39'"  036"  0.29"  036"
(3.29)  (3.82)  (2.48)  (2.81)  (2.32)  (2.07)
Labor  (L)  0.15  0.11  0.96  0.29  0.26  1.23
(032)  (0.26)  (0.13)  (0.46)  (0.42)  (1.23)
N  25  25  1S  25  25  14
Countries (No>)  25  25  15  25  25  14
0.249  0.339  0.318  0ox7  0.10  0.176
R2
Note: Country  dummy  results  are not reported;  t-statistics  are shown  in parenthesis.
26TABLE 3
FIED  EFFECT ESTIMATION USING POOLED ANNUAL  LEVEL DATA
Sub-Saharan Africa
(Log GDP  = b, log K + h. log L + b3 log TP  + b4 Dummies)
1967-87  1981-87
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Trade  Shares  (IP1)  0.527  - - - 0.40*  -
(4.43)  (3.69)
Black  market  -0.001...  - -0.001
Premium(TP2)  (-3.0)  (-1.47)
HiT Index  (TP3)  0.02-  0.03' 
______________________  _______  (1.9  5)  _______  ________  _____195  (2.80)
DS Index  (TP4)  0.15-  Q14
.__  _ _  _ _  _ _  _ _  _ _  _ _  _ _  _ _  _ _ _  _ _ _  _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _(18.1)  (l  O  S)
Capital Stock (K)  0.40  0.3r  0.49"  0.44-  0.44  0.40  0.50  Q42-
(17.1)  (16.8)  (6.13)  (19.4)  (7.82)  (6.99)  (6.4)  (736)
Labor (L)  0.34-  0.27-  0.46..  0.25  0.35  0.36  0.52  Q34
(5.06)  (4.41)  (5.09)  (3.9)  (3.56)  (3.72)  (5.4)  (35)
N  558  472  122  546  180  182  97  182
Countries (No.)  27  26  16  25  27  26  16  25
R2  0.987  0.991  0.998  0.987  0.997  0.997  0.999  0.99B
Note:  Country dummy results are not reported and t-statistics are in parenthesis.
27TABLE  4
FIED  EFFECI  ESTIMATION USING POOLED ANNUAL  DIF  NCES
Sub-Saharan  Africa
(Log dif GDP  = C, log dif K + C2 log dif L + C3 log dif TP +  C 4 Dummies)
1967-87  1981-87
(1)  (2)  (1)  (2)
Trade Shares (TP1)  0.02'  - 0.06:C  -
(1.64)  . (3.05)  l
Black market  -0.004*  -0.002
Premium(TP2)  (-2.00)  (-0.77)
Capital Stock (K)  0.51'**  O48A  0.55*  0.21
(8.67)  (6.18)  (3.72)  (1.39)
Labor (L)  1.08  0.93  3.81  0.68
(1.67)  (1.05)  (1.50)  (1.39)
N  558  335  182  144
Countries (No)  27  25  27  20
A  2  0.146  0.122  0.202  0.018
28TABLE 5
IMPACr OF OPENNESS IN SSAs A SYNTHESIS
(1967-87)
Fixed Effect  Cross Section
Estimation  Estimation
Openness
Variable  Level  Difference  L.evel  Difference
1.  Trade Shares  >0"  >O"  <0  <0
2.  Black Marketb  >OW  >0!00  <0  >0
Premium
3.  Trade  >0o  >0  >0  >0
Liberalization
Index (HT Index)
4.  Outward  >o  >0  >0!
Orientation
Index (D $ Index)
Indicates significant at  1 percent  level;  ** indicates significant at  5 percent  level;  e  indicates
significant  at 10 percent leveL
Notes:
a.  Pooled annual data regressions include country dummies.
b.  Since '>0" implies more openness (less distortion) has a positive effect on growth, therefore for black
market premium the table shows  W70s  when the estimates show that a higher level of premium or
distortion affects performance negatively.
29TABLE  6
COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THE REGRESSIONS
Sub-Saharan Africa  Non-Sub-Saharan Africa
1.  Burundi  1.  Argentina
2.  Benin  2.  Bangladesh
3.  Central African Republic  3.  Bolivia
4.  Cote d'Ivoire  4.  Brazil
5.  Cameroon  5.  Chile
6.  Congo  6.  China
7.  Ethiopia  7.  Colombia
8.  Gabon  8.  Costa Rica
9.  Ghana  9.  Algeria
10.  Burkina Faso  10.  Egypt
11.  Kenya  11.  Guatemala
12.  Liberia  12.  Haiti
13.  Madagascar  13.  Hungary
14.  Mali  14.  Indonesia
15.  Mauritania  15.  India
16.  Mauritius  16.  Jamaica
17.  Malawi  17.  South Korea
18.  Nigeria  18.  Sri Lanka
19.  Rwanda  19.  Morocco
20.  Sudan  20.  Mexico
21.  Senegal  21.  Malaysia
22.  Togo  22.  Nicaragua
23.  Tanzania  23.  Pakistan
24.  Uganda  24.  Panama
25.  Zaire  25.  Peru
26.  Zambia  26.  Philippines







SENSITIVITY OF OPENNESS-PERFORMANCE  ESTIMATES  TO FISCAL POLICY'
Annual  Level  Data  Annual  Change  Data  Annual  Level  Data  Amnal  Change  Data 1967-87  1967-87  1981-87  1981-87
Measures  Openness  Gov't  Openness  Gov't  Openness  Gov't  Openness  Gov't Consumption  Consumption  Consumption  Consumntion
Trade  0.57***  -0.88***  0.03*  -0.08*** -0.41***  0.11  0.07***  -0.03 Shares  (4.72)  (-5.24)  (1.83)  (-4.41)  (3.73)  (0.49)  (3.35)  (-0.77)
Black  _o.o001**  -0.63***  _0.0O5**  -0.06**  -0.00001  0.29  -0.0001  -0.03 Market  (-2.55)  (-3.42)  (-2.12)  (2.35)  (0.76)  (1.17)  (-0.03)  (-0.70) Premium
HT  Index  0.03**  0.43  -0.004  0.06 (1.93)  (1.43)  (-0.35)  (0.17)
D $  Index  0.13***  0.96**  -0.12**  0.09 (15.82)  (5.49)  (8.41)  (0.39)
Note:1/  Fiscal  policy  is  proxied  by the  times  Series  Data  on  GDP  share  of  government  consumption  which  was available  for  23  countries  only.  These  regressions  thus  involve  a  slightly  smaller  sam  pe than  those  in Tables  1  to  4,  but  their  adjusted  R-squares  improve  with  the  inclusion  of  this  variable.  T-statistics are  in  parenthesis.
312~~~~~~~~~
17
__  X 
I 
"  9  19§  __ 
}t  __ 
t 
IA
_  _  _I 
_ 
oI
|~  ~  ~  J~  p 
0P| 
|  |;|  w  p  31  1  5 
U  _~  .7_+  3
i  "  g  ;n  Be  . . . +AR__ 
'.3~~~~~ 
."  C  Bv w __X__  _fI~
_  .S  5'b  a 
S  _  _  _  B vPX b  a  _  _  _  _  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~F'TABLE 9
CROSS SECTION  ESIMATION USING PE:RIOD  DIFFERENCE  DATA
Non Sub-Saran  Afrfcan Countr&es
(LoA  Di  GDP  C + C log dif K + C  og df  L +C  log  dil TP)
1967-87  1981-87
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Trade Shares (TP1)  0.14  ,  - 0.06
(2.41)  (1.77)
Black market  -0.02  -0.02  -
Premium  (-1.21)  (-150)
K.  Index  - -0.20  . - 0.07
- .(1.98)  (-0.80)
Capital Stock  0.57"  0.69  0.62"  0.70  0.80"  0.62
(6.47)  (7.19)  (8.25)  (7.02)  (7.08)  (3.56)
Labor (L)  0.30  0.13  0.33  0.16"  0.07  -0.13
(1.07)  (0.3)  (0.96)  (2.17)  (0.77)  (-0.12)
N  29  24  16  =  31  26  16  =
Countries (No.)  29  24  16  . 31  26  16
R2  0.721  0.700  0.848  _  0.857  o0868  0.472
Note: Intercept results are not reported; t-statistics  are shown in parenthesis.
33TABLE  10
FIED  EFFECT  ESlIMATION  USING  POOLED  ANNUAL  LEVIL DATA
Non-Sub-Sabamn  Afican Countries
kLog GDP  = b, log K + b2 log L + b, log TP + b0 Dummies)
1_.5  7.87  198147
(lb  (2)  (3)  (4)  (2)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Trade Sham  (IPI)  04.'*  . . . 0.36w
(6.12)  (3.2)_
Black warkt  _  0.0001  . . . 0.0001
Premium (7?2)  _  (-3.96)  (.0.92)
HT Index  (P3)  . 0.01  . . . 0.013
_________________  _________  (1.18)  (1.17)
DS Index (TP4)  . . 0.19  . 023
_____________________  _____________  ___________  (18.8)  .___________  _  __8__  (12.1)
Capital  Stock  (K)  0.53  057  0.71  0.s9  0.67O  0.68w  0.71  0,67w
(35.1)  (41.0)  (1035)  (21.6)  (1199)  (135)  (9.43)  (10.02)
Labor (L)  0.21  0.17  4.07  0.09  G05  -0.03  0.02  .035
(5.3)  (48)  (-0.46)  (-1.18)  (0.45)  (0.34)  (0.129)  (.2.43)
N  661  658  135  364  221  224  10  140
Countrles  (NQ)  32  32  16  27  32  32  16  27
R2  0.996  0.995  0.998  0.997  0.999  0.999  0.998  0.999
34TABLE 11
FDID  EFFECT ESTIMATION USING °OOLED ANNUAL  DIFFERENCES
Non-Sub-Saharan African Countries
Log dif GDP = c, log dif k + c 2 log dif L + c3 log dif TP +  Cd Dummies)
1967-87  1981-87  -_  -
(1)  (2)  (1)  (2)
Trade  Shares  (TP1)  0.02  0."" 
(1.92)  (3.23)
Black market  . -0.003'  0.0001
Premium(TP2)  (-2.16)  (0.03)
Capital Stock (K)  0.65  0.68W*  .46e  0.50e
(13.52)  (12.3)  (4.07)  (3.99)
Labor (L)  -0.05  0.11  0.14  0.16
(-0.25)  (0.51)  (0.54)  (0.59)
N  628  508  220  189
Countries (No)  32  31  32  30
R2  0.334  0.338  0.396  -. I
Note:  Intercept results are not reported; t-statistics are in parenthesis.
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